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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-PREFERENTIAL PAYMENTS-KNOWLEDGE OF INSOLVENCY.
Plaintiff, as receiver of the Hurley National Bank, seeks to recover the sum
of $1,500, asserted to be recoverable by him as part of a $6,000 preferential pay-
ment made by the bank to the defendant the morning that the bank closed. The
evidence disclosed that the bank had been in difficulties for some time, and that
the officers had attempted to accomplish a merger with another bank in the
same city. Information of the attempted merger was disclosed to one of the
stockholders of the defendant, who was also a director of the other bank hut
an officer of that bank testified that no information concerning the bank's actual
condition was communicated to him. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. Payment is not "preferential" where no
information concerning the banks actual condition was communicated to the
stockholder or depositor by officers of either bank. Kelley v. Paul Clothing &
Shoe Co., (Wis. 1937) 271 N.W. 6.
One of the objects of the national banking system is to secure, in event of
insolvency, a just and equal distribution of assets of national banks among
unsecured creditors and to prevent such banks from creating preferences in
contemplation of their failure. See REv. STAT. § 5242, 12 U.S.C.A. § 91 (1936) ;
Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, 80 F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935),
aff'd on certiorari, Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, 57 Sup. Ct. 81,
81 L.ed. 25 (1936). So long as an insolvent bank is continuing business and
pays a depositor in the ordinary course of business, the depositor has no notice
of the bank's condition, and the bank intends no preference, it is generally
recognized that the depositor making withdrawals will be protected even as
against express statutes prohibiting insolvent corporations preferring creditors.
Oesterreicher v. McNair, 54 F. (2d) 798 (S.D. Fla. 1932), 13 L.R.A. (N.s.) 185
(1908); Nelson v. Lewis, 73 F. (2d) 521 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934). On the other hand,
it is true that payment made by an insolvent bank, or made in contemplation
of insolvency, with the intent to give a preference to a particular creditor, is
void, irrespective of whether the insolvency was open and notorious, or whether
the payee knew of the insolvency or motive of the bank in making the payment.
Rucker v. Kokrda, 68 F. (2d) 73, (C.C.A. 10th, 1933) ; Aycock v. Bradbury, 77
F. (2d) 14, (C.C.A. 10th, 1935). Where a withdrawal was made by an assistant
cashier of a national bank of all funds in an account of an estate of which he
was executor and in a savings account of his minor children, the evidence sus-
tained a finding that such a withdrawal was in contemplation of insolvency,
and constituted an unlawful preference. Smith v. Baldwin, 69 F. (2d) 390,'(D.C.
App. 1934). So also where all of the depositor's money was withdrawn in a
single sum, not to be used in his business, but to be placed elsewhere for safe-
keeping, and while there was a run on the bank, was evidence sufficient to show
that the money was paid with intent to give a preference, and was not paid
in the regular course of business. Pearson v. Durell, 77 F. (2d) 465, (C.C.A.
6th, 1935). Where the check in question was withdrawn by the president of the
defendant company, who was then and for two years prior thereto had been
a director of the bank and fully knew its precarious condition, it was held that
the payment was not made in the usual course of business, and hence consti-
tuted a preference. Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, supra. The Wis-
consin court in the instant case is of the opinion that, although enough informa-
tion came to the stockholder as a director of the other bank to give rise to a
suspicion that the affairs of the bank were not financially satisfactory, yet there
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was no actual proof that he had any inside information as to the bank's condi-
tion, and hence a payment to him could not be considered preferential. The
dissenting justices thought, that the mere proposal of a merger officially com-
municated to a director was sufficient that he might reasonably infer during the
recent crisis that the bank which proposed it was financially embarrassed.
RicitARD M. RIcE.
CORPORATIONs-LEGAL ENTITY-FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS.-The
plaintiff sued the investment company, a Wisconsin corporation, and others to
recover damages growing out of an investment made by the plaintiff in 1932.
The trial court found that on January 1, 1931, the investment company ceased
to exist as a corporation, because on that day its charter was forfeited for
failure of the company to file its annual report with the secretary of state in
compliance with Section 180.08 (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935). The
court therefore held that the company was not in existence as a corporation
or as a legal entity when the plaintiff deposited his investment with the secre-
tary of the company in 1932. Judgment, however, was entered in favor of the
plaintiff against all the defendants. On appeal, held, judgment affirmed, but the
finding of the trial court that the company was not in existence as a corporation
or as a legal entity was a conclusion of law unsupported by the evidence. "The
failure of a corporation to file its annual report as required by Section 180.08(2),
Stats., does not work a forfeiture of corporate rights and privileges ipso facto."
Lindsley v. Farmers Exchange Investment Company, (Wis. 1937) 271 N.W. 364.
The question arising is whether a statute providing a declaration of for-
feiture of corporate privileges by a public administrative official for failure of
the corporation to comply with the statute dissolves an offending corporation,
or merely renders it liable to dissolution. Decisions quite uniformly hold to the
latter alternative. In Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 30 W.Va. 43, 3 S.E. 227
(1887), on the general question of forfeiture of corporate rights, the court held
that a suit by a private corporation cannot be dismissed because the corporation
has been dissolved by forfeiture of its charter for non-payment of a license tax.
The theory was that a cause of forfeiture cannot be enforced collaterally
against a corporation, but can be enforced only by the state in a direct pro-
ceeding for that purpose. See also Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 Fed. 613 (C.C.A.
2d, 1919), where the corporation was the defendant rather than the plaintiff and
the court held that a corporation whose charter has been repealed for failure
to pay a state tax is liable for debts contracted after the repeal. In a North
Dakota case involving failure to file an annual report under a statute providing
for cancellation of the corporate charter by the secretary of state in that event,
the court held that the statute by itself would not work a forfeiture of the
corporate charter in the absence of a direct proceeding for that purpose, and
that a collateral attack in that direction would be inadmissible. Farmers State
Bank v. Brown, 52 N.D. 806, 204 N.W. 673 (1925). Section 180.08(2) of the
Wisconsin Statutes (1935) provides that if a corporation fails to file its annual
report within the specified time, "the corporate rights and privileges granted to
such corporation shall be declared forfeited by the secretary of state . . . " The
Wisconsin court, in interpreting this section, has adopted the reasoning of the
Brown Case, supra, in West Park Realty Co. v. Porth, 192 Wis. 307, 212 N.W.
651 (1927), and follows it in the principal case. The section is interpreted as
not declaring a forfeiture, but providing a declaration which operates as a
cause for forfeiture which may be enforced by proceedings instituted by the
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